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Abstract
We use a general equilibrium life-cycle model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous
agents to evaluate the macroeconomic and welfare implications of Defined Benefit (DB)
versus Defined Contribution (DC) systems, and to investigate the eﬀects of incremental
reform within a particular system. Extensive calibrations illustrate the trade-oﬀ between
eﬃciency and redistribution that a tax-financed, DB social security system generates. We
find that social welfare is maximized for small but positive levels of DB because of the
redistributive value associated with these systems. On the other hand, steady-state within-
DC system comparisons reveal that a zero DC tax rate maximizes social welfare.
JEL Classification: E21, E62, H55.
Key Words: General Equilibrium, Liquidity Constraints, Heterogeneous Agents, Undi-
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1 Introduction
Financing retirement benefits is probably the most significant fiscal challenge that govern-
ments in industrial economies will be facing in the next few decades. Social security reform
has therefore become an important public policy issue for many countries and various re-
form proposals have been recently put forth. Given the importance of understanding the
aggregate and welfare implications of diﬀerent social security systems existing in the OECD,
a number of recent papers have investigated the implications of social security reform from
the perspective of a general equilibrium, heterogeneous agent model with reasonable levels of
idiosyncratic labor income uncertainty and market frictions (see, among others, I˙mrohog˘lu,
I˙mrohog˘lu and Joines (1995), De Nardi, I˙mrohog˘lu and Sargent (1999), Bohn (1999), Conesa
and Krueger (1999), Gertler (1999), Huggett and Ventura (1999), Storesletten, Telmer and
Yaron (1999), Diamond and Geanakoplos (2002), Fuster, I˙mrohog˘lu and I˙mrohog˘lu (forth-
coming) and Caballé and Fuster (forthcoming)).1
We follow this general equilibrium literature to analyze the aggregate and welfare implica-
tions of social security arrangements in the presence of empirically relevant market frictions
and individual heterogeneity, taking care to explicitly embed in the model the main institu-
tional, national social security arrangements observed in OECD economies. Specifically, we
compare the aggregate implications of defined benefit (DB) versus defined contribution (DC)
systems and also investigate the economic outcomes from varying the generosity of a partic-
ular system. That is, we perform a comparison both between DB and DC systems but also
within a particular system. We do this because an incremental reform (like an increase in
payroll social security taxation or a reduction in benefits) might be more easily implemented
in a politico-economic equilibrium than a more radical reform that replaces a pay-as-you-go
(PAYGO) defined benefit (DB) system with a fully-funded, defined contribution (DC) one.
The closest paper to ours is Storeslsetten, Telmer and Yaron (1999) and it is useful to
point out certain important diﬀerences. First, we perform the analysis within a particular
1A parallel literature analyzes similar issues by taking the interest rate and/or the rate of return on
equity as exogenous (see, among others, Campbell et. al. (2001), Feldstein and Ranguelova (2001), Deaton,
Gourinchas and Paxson (2002) and Miles and Sefton (2002), for instance).
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system (DB or DC) allowing us to make welfare statements about more gradual reforms
within an existing system. Second, our specification of social security arrangements is diﬀer-
ent. For instance, we include a flat pension that arises regardless of prior contributions but is
earned simply by being a citizen in the particular economy, an arrangement that seems to be
pervasive in OECD social security systems. Third, we introduce accidental and intentional
bequests as determinants of the initial wealth distribution in the economy. Either of these
assumptions is defensible according to recent evidence on wealth accumulation over the life
cycle (Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2002) argue for accidental bequests while Laitner (2001)
and De Nardi (fortcoming) argue for the explicit imposition of a bequest motive). Fourth,
in an attempt to generate more realistic wealth distribution profiles, we experiment with
diﬀerent levels of ex ante heterogeneity in discount rates, following the Krusell and Smith
(1998) infinite horizon results that small discount rate heterogeneity can match the skewed
U.S. wealth distribution.
Given the desire to incorporate observed social security arrangements in the model, we
first broadly describe diﬀerent social security systems that exist in OECD economies and
attempt to classify them into categories with broadly similar institutional features. We
then embed aspects of these institutional arrangements in a realistically calibrated general
equilibrium life-cycle model to quantify the implications for aggregate saving and capital
formation. By varying the institutional features of the model, we can then better understand
the potential eﬀects of social security reform.
A normative question of interest concerns the balance between the distortionary eﬀect
of Social Security taxation and the risk sharing benefit of a Social Security system. We find
that the insurance provided by a DB system can outweigh the eﬃciency cost from higher
taxes to finance the DB payments. As a result, social welfare is maximized at positive DB
provision levels. On the other hand, the fully-funded DC system that taxes an individual
and oﬀers the benefits during retirement depending on the interest rate and the individual’s
contributions, does not improve social (aggregate) welfare for any positive tax rate. There
are two main reasons for this surprising result. First, the constraint that forces young work-
ers to save through the DC account distorts the consumption-saving allocation suﬃciently
to generate consumption profiles for the poor that are substantially diﬀerent from what they
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would have preferred in the absence of forced saving. Second, the models generate higher
capital accumulation and a lower interest rate implying that saving for retirement (either
through the DC or non-DC account) earns a lower rate of return that outweighs the positive
eﬀect of higher mean wages in the economy. Equivalently, in incomplete market (liquid-
ity constraint) models similar to the ones studied in this paper there is over-accumulation
of capital (Aiyagari, 1995). Introducing compulsory saving makes the liquidity constraint
more binding for the more unlucky agents in the economy who experience lower earnings
draws, generating additional precautionary saving over and above the already high capital
accumulation implied by the zero DC tax rate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes some of the key facts about social
expenditure in the OECD and also categorizes the diﬀerent social security systems in three
main groups. Section 3 goes through the theoretical model and describes the equilibrium in
the economy. Section 4 analyzes the defined benefit (DB) system and section 5 the defined
contribution (DC) one. Section 6 concludes.
2 Stylized Facts on Pension Spending in the OECD
2.1 Old-Age Social Spending in the OECD
It is instructive to briefly review the evidence on the amount of public social expenditure
in the OECD, and in particular, the amount of old-age social spending. To that eﬀect, we
use the OECD Social Expenditure Database: 1980-1998, 2001 edition. Table 1 reports the
public social expenditure in the OECD between 1980 and 1998 as a percentage of GDP.
Table 1 shows that the average social expenditure over all economies for this period is quite
high (around twenty percent of GDP). Moreover, there is substantial variation in public
spending both across countries and, for the same country, across time. Greece, for instance,
starts 1980 with a share equal to 11.5 percent but rises to 22.7 percent by 1998. On the
other hand, certain countries have kept total social expenditure relatively constant over the
period: Austria and Belgium have varied their social expenditure between 25 and 27 percent
of GDP in the last decade. Furthermore, continental Europe has a substantially higher social
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